Article submitted by: James on 25-Nov-2011  
=== The ultimate truth revealed ===
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The ultimate truth revealed

Dear readers, do-gooders and wrongdoers,

A few months ago there appeared a news item on the 1990 elections in
the press that only drew little attention in comments thereafter. The
Irrawaddy of Friday, July 29th 2011, in the article "EC Chief says NLD
threatened junta with 'Nuremburg-style' trial" reported: "On Wednesday
[July 27th 2011] the EC chief ex-Gen Tin Aye told officials [...] that
the NLD [...] was not given power following the 1990 election because
the party had threatened to bring the then military leaders before a
war tribunal." [1] This issue deserves more attention as it may have
serious implications.

The story
On July 27th 2011 the head of the UEC, Tin Aye, made public that the
real reason that the 1990 junta did not allow the winner of the
elections, the NLD, to take power and reign was that the NLD
assumingly would have planned to prosecute the junta for humanitarian
crimes. The NLD didn't really announce this intention, but in July
1990 the late NLD leader Kyi Maung had expressed, that Burma would NOT
[capitalisation by JRB] need any Nuremburg-style tribunal, when asked
for possible prosecution of the military of that time. There
apparently was enough reason to consider trying the military for
humanitarian crimes, especially with regard to the violent and bloody
crackdown of the nationwide pro-democracy protests in 1988 [2]. "In
response to Tin Aye's remarks, NLD spokesman Nyan Win said on Friday
[July 29th 2011] that the late NLD leader Kyi Maung never said that
there would be a war tribunal." [1]. However, Kyi Maung's response at
the time, even while objecting, was a sufficient excuse for the 1990
junta, yet fearing prosecution, to arrest him and to convict him to 17
years imprisonment.

Questions and facts
Did Tin Aye really made that public recently? Several news media just
copied the news item from the Irrawaddy [3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9]. After a
thorough search on the internet it seems that there are no other
sources reporting this event independently. The news has also been
copied in SCB (Usenet Newsgroup soc.culture.burma) [10], but generated
no discussion between junta supporters and opposition supporters.

Furthermore, though the news was actually only spread by the
Irrawaddy, it has not been revoked or contradicted by any other
source, not even by official junta sources. Nothing to that extent
could be found on the internet. Hence, one may reasonably assume that
it is correct, that Tin Aye made that statement.

Isn't Tin Aye on the side of the junta? Well, yes, he is. While being
a civilian now he still is chairman of the Union Election Commission
and met Human Rights Special Rapporteur Mr Thomas Ojea Quintana on his
tour from 21 to 25 August 2011 [11, 12]. Tin Aye is still seen
regularly, lately (15 November 2011) receiving the Australian
Ambassador [13].

What consequence did his publication have for Tin Aye? Apparently
none, as can be seen from the above mentioned references. Tin Aye
still is Chairman of the UEC. He hasn't fallen from grace. Yet Tin Aye
actually told something that obviously is not in the interest of the
junta (see further paragraph 'Motivation').

Did the NLD of 1990 really announce prosecution of the military? As is
clear from the news report, given above, the NLD did certainly not
announce to want the military being tried. On the contrary, Kyi Maung
contradicted it, even while the NLD may have thought about it. The NLD
apparently did not judge it a main goal to reach; it firstly and
mainly would want the power to rebuild a democracy as desired by the
Burmese population.

Did the NLD have a point at that time? Of course, in 1990 there
already were sufficient reasons to prosecute the military for
humanitarian crimes (as stated above). Since then the number of
arguments have only increased. Many occasions of humanitarian crimes
and repression by the junta have been reported by the international
news media and human rights organisations. Many examples of continuing
deception, fraud and abuse have been published that the junta applies
to maintain its power and wealth. Many times the junta has silenced
and intimidated the opposition and the population by making political
prisoners, serving long sentences. The junta has the guns loaded and
uses them, the law of the jungle.

Was the fear of the junta for prosecution really its reason for not
accepting the NLD as the winner? The junta, shortly after the 1990
elections, stated that these were only meant to choose representatives
for the National Convention. There has been a lot of discussion about
this and about the timing that the junta said this: before or after
the elections. It was sufficiently shown that it was a dirty trick of
the junta after the elections in order to justify its rejection of the
election result as a means to form a new government. [14, 15]

Now it has appeared that even that wasn't the real reason for the
generals to reject the election outcomes. The real reason was their
fear of the risk of being prosecuted, while they would escape that
risk at all costs and wanted to remain in power forever. Not
recognising the election results was their best precaution to
eliminate every possible risk of yet being prosecuted. The junta had
not expected the overwhelming victory for the opposition, i.e. the
NLD, in 1990.

Did either the NLD or the junta recently contradict anything that the
Tin Aye alleged? No, neither of them seems to have contradicted that.
Actually it seems that neither of them has discussed the allegations
of Tin Aye in any way, silence all around. This could be expected from
the junta, more often having ignored news reports that were
unfavourable to them, but the silence of the NLD is rather unexpected.
Maybe it can be explained by the current restraint of the NLD,
avoiding to cause polarisation and obstruction, while heading for
cooperation and reconciliation, the gentle, soft and gradual approach.

Motivation
Tin Aye's statement is not in the interest of the junta, how was it
possible that he said that? Why did Tin Aye say this? Any reason, any
cause? It may be quite well possible that Tin Aye has let his tongue
run away with him. He may not have planned to say it, but in the
course of the talks he may have been challenged to say something that
he already knew for a long time. It is difficult to guess what other
reasons and causes may have played a role. While actually betraying
the junta's real intentions he also may have thought that it did not
matter much anymore. It was a long time ago, already nullified by the
junta and everyone already knew that the junta was lying about the
real reason for ignoring the election results. Yet by revealing the
real truth he at least stopped all misunderstanding about the junta's
real, bad intentions; we don't have to doubt that anymore.

Conclusions
What lessons can be learned from Tin Aye's revelation? Are the reasons
that the junta gave since then for not recognising the 1990 election
results and the NLD's victory as the basis for a new government now
declared untrue and officially wiped out? Was the then NLD's
interpretation of the consequences of its victory true and just?

The following firm conclusions can be drawn from Tin Aye's recent
statement:
a. The junta obviously has been lying about the 1990 elections when
saying that those were only intended for the composition of the NC.
"The official reason the military leaders did not hand over power
in 1990 was that the regime said the election was only intended to
chose representatives to a committee to draft a new national
constitution." [1].
b. The junta implicitly admits the NLD's victory in the 1990 elections
as well;
c. The NLD was right in claiming its victory. The NLD justly opposed
the junta's explanation and interpreted the junta's initial and
broken promises correctly;
d. The junta obviously appears to fear prosecution and conviction for
humanitarian crimes. If they wouldn't be guilty they wouldn't have
to fear anything and could face prosecution. But by escaping
prosecution by increasing and extending dictatorial rule they
actually admit to be guilty of committing humanitarian crimes.
e. To avoid prosecution for crimes the junta increased and intensified
its humanitarian crimes, causing even more and prolonged
suppression to put down opposition against suppression, committing
even more evil to escape conviction for doing evil, covering crimes
with ongoing crimes;
f. The main inference that is to be drawn is: the junta unjustly kept
the NLD from taking over. The junta has applied this treacherous
strategy for over 21 years, of which 19 years under Than Shwe. The
junta continued imprisoning and killing opponents until there
virtually is no one more to oppose. This injustice has been DONE,
yet it is 'NOT DONE'; will it be UNDONE? The people have the right
to demand that. Knowing the junta there practically is little
chance that their crimes will be undone, even while possibly
reversable.

As a consequence:
a. the puppet show continues;
b. the lies continue;
c. the deception continues;
d. the intimidation continues;
e. the repression continues;
f. the imprisoning of innocent political opponents continues;
g. the fighting against minorities continues;
h. the robbing continues;
i. the slavery continues;
j. the abuse using people as living shields continues;
k. the raping of women by soldiers continues;
l. the exploit of the people and the land to the benefit of the
dictators continues;
m. the killing continues;
n. the lack of freedom in every sense continues;
o. poverty continues;
p. the genocide continues;
q. and so on, and so on.

Explanations
How is it possible that the military, in particular the self-appointed
rulers, continue to treat the Burmese population (to put it mildly) in
such an evil way and can do so indefinitely without being corrected
and punished? How is it possible that the army, the soldiers continue
to obey the generals and to abuse the population? In general: how is
it possible that people harm each other up to such an inhumane extent?
Committing crimes, violence and other atrocities can be explained in
detail [16], but below specific explanations that may apply to the
Burmese case are elaborated:

The below first 3 explanations in particular applies to the junta
itself and the higher military ranks.
a. First of all, there is the reason and explanation of personal
benefit, egocentric behaviour, addiction to power and not wanting
to give up anything of the wealth and status reached. There also is
the fear of losing everything once giving in, to be prosecuted and
punished. The junta wants to avoid that at all costs. This fear may
cause hatred and alleged justification of the restriction of human
rights to people;
b. Secondly, there is the (faked) fear of assumed threats to the
security and integrity of the state, whatever that is, which should
be punished according to the junta abusing that as an excuse;
c. Thirdly, there is more than enough criticism, calling for
correction and punishment, both from within Burma and abroad. The
amount and extent of criticism could and might be increased to
become more effective, but there is no lack of criticism. Yet
criticism alone clearly does not change the Burmese world. Critics
inside Burma are caught and imprisoned, tried and sentenced to very
long detention (political prisoners). Critics outside Burma are
just ignored or resisted. But the world, the governments and formal
organisations, is too soft and too weak. The world should show more
balls to force significant changes in Burma, just like it did in
North Africa and the Middle East since the beginning of this year
(2011). It should do so via the UN and its resolutions, involving
the support of China, Russia and India. The UN should not so much
call for military intervention (like in Libya) because that might
cause more violence and bloodshed than any other alternative. Yet
the UN might firmly call for reconciliation and negotition. But
this is close to China's home and, unlike with the revolutions
around the Mediterrean, China until now does not want to risk its
'good relation' with its direct neighbour and its own (economic)
interests in Burma. That makes Burma a different case from the
North African countries.

The below last 2 explanations in particular apply to the lower
military ranks.
d. Once you abuse or kill someone, abusing or killing the next one is
easier. Though many military may have been reluctant initially to
commit violence and humanitarian crimes against their own fellow
countrymen, they may develop a less responsible mind once having
yet committed their first abuse. This is a known psychological
phenomenon [17, 18, 19, 20]. The first time one learns to know
oneself, a new experience; any subsequent time one practices that
knowledge and extends it. Addiction to crime it is called too [21]
when there is an internal drive to get to know oneself even better.
e. Related to that is the pressure from the superior military, the
hierarchical structure and control within the army. If a soldier
would refuse to carry out orders he would be punished severely,
possibly killed himself. The motto in the army is: do as told and
be a good, brainless, unscrupulous, destructive robot with freedom
or rather obligation to abuse and kill. This applies in particular
to child soldiers that have been recruited by force [22]. The
desire to belong to a group, whatever that is, may also play a role
[23]. These crimes are called "crimes of obedience", crimes carried
out as ordered, approved or tolerated by superiors [20, 24],
'Befehl ist Befehl' (a command is a command). This results in
destruction, robbing, chasing, raping, slavery, imprisonment,
killing, genocide and holocaust [25].

These explanations are also applicable to many other occasions in the
past. For instance the serious and structural extermination of
complete parts of the population in the past in Cambodia, Communist
China, USSR, Nazi-Germany are clear examples of the downward spiral in
the perpetrators of the crimes, especially of considered legal and
justified in those places and at those times. Current examples are
North Korea and Syria.

Sanctions
How should the surrounding, and more distant, more democratic world
react? Whatever reaction, it preferably should be supported by the UN,
including by countries like China, Russia and India. Without those any
support for and development into worldwide democracy is insufficient
and still far away. Two kinds of reactions are quite well possible,
one already is ongoing.
a. Ongoing economic sanctions should remain ongoing as a sign of utter
dissatisfaction with the situation in Burma. However, they might
have to be reviewed with respect to their effect on the junta and
that on the civilian population of Burma. As a result the sanctions
might be dosed more precise, some might possibly be lifted, while
on the other hand any humanitarian aid should also be carefully
administered to have an optimal effect [26, 27].
b. Freezing of assets of junta members abroad (in Western countries)
if there are such, like those from Libya's Muammar Gaddafi. It
should as well be done with regard to the assets of Syria's Bashar
al-Assad if any. However, how many assets do the Burmese generals
personally have in (Western) countries that would possibly consider
freezing those assets? It is not sufficiently known where the
generals have put their savings in the bank [28, 29, 30abc, 31,
32ab, 33] Other assets of people close to the generals may
partially be under foreign jurisdiction [34]. Dictators like the
Burmese ones are rich, very rich (and they don't want to lose
that); for example Than Shwe's daugther's wedding costed $300,000,
while the value of all gifts was $50,000,000 [35, 36]. Furthermore,
in 2008, at the time of the cyclone Nargis, Than Shwe had
considered to buy the British football club Manchester United for
about $1,000,000,000 (one billion dollars), just a fraction of his
possessions [37].

Revelations
Quite recently we learned that the junta already knew the real number
of dead (and missing) victims from the cyclone Nargis in May 2008
after a month, around 300,000, but never told that. Instead the junta
officially kept the number of victims at about 130,000. The first
revelations about the number of 300,000 leaked already in May 2008, 3
weeks after the disaster [38]. The former SPDC's Vice Senior General
Maung Aye on June 7th, 2008, confirmed it to the Burmese business
tycoon Tay Za as a diplomatic cable of June 11th, 2008, that was
released recently [39].

The junta in 2008 officially lied about the real number of victims to
try to cover up for their guilt having significantly contributed to
that high number of victims by their own laxity and negligence [40].
The number of victims could have been reduced largely by
a. not delaying humanitarian aid support;
b. not refusing most of the offered foreign aid support;
c. not exchanging fresh, foreign food supplies with inferior, already
stored food supplies;
d. not limiting the relief effort to be carried out by only the army;
e. not discouraging and inhibiting civilians from carrying out rescue
and support operations;
f. not sacrificing the relief effort to the extravagant bureaucracy,
exchange rates and corruption.

What more revelations can we expect from the junta and its
accomplices? Do the people of Burma need more startling disclosures?
Don't they already know more than enough? Don't they already know that
the junta is lying, cheating and deceiving always, including about
their so-called 'democratic' puppet-government? Don't the Burmese
people already know that the junta is oppressing always and
continuously by whatever means, intimidating and violent? That they do
that because they do not want to loose their power, their wealth and
their status at all costs and they don't want to weaken their position
and to risk prosecution? That they do not think of the people of
Burma, but only about themselves, their own welfare.

Wouldn't newly reported old revelations make a difference? Well, of
course they would, old facts about the junta's secrets and tricks,
when published now, would add to undermine the junta's position,
making them even more ridiculous, incredible and admittedly cruel and
criminal. That already is known and has been shown many times, but
every new fact may contribute to the pressure on the junta to get
lost. The junta has shown to be able to stand a lot of pressure or to
disregard their crumbling off entirely. Well, then their sudden
collapse sometime will come by surprise, quite unexpectedly to them.

Needs
What do the people of Burma need? Economic improvements, jobs? Yes,
primarily perhaps, but more than that alone. Better education? Yes,
but not only that. Higher income, better housing, better food? Yes,
but that is only the start. More influence on economic decision
making? That would be nice, but that would need a significant
restructuring of the bureaucracy, banning fraud, bribing and
hierarchical abuse.

What the people of Burma really and mainly want is freedom, self-
determination, freedom of speech, freedom to criticise, freedom of
press. They want a real democracy, freely elected representatives, no
rigging and intimidation, no orchestrated elections results, no
puppet-government of the junta, no former generals. They want basic
human rights to be allowed to say and criticise what they want without
being caught and imprisoned as a political prisoner.

The people also want an end to the abuses of the Burmese internal
army, the killing, robbing, slavery, rape, destruction against the
Burmese people. They also want to influence large scale
infrastructural developments, like power plants for China, weighing
the pros and cons of such developments for themselves.

All that is what the people want. Will the junta give it to them just
like that and if so, would the people have to be grateful to the junta
for finally giving that, while having refrained from giving it for
such a long time? The criminal generals have hijacked the country,
kidnapped the opposition, keeping all other people hostage. Can the
people expect or demand the junta to give them back what they
rightfully own?

Scenarios
There are 3 main scenarios for the immediate future of Burma,
excluding a very much undesired, violent, revolutionary scenario:
a. unconditional obedience and surrender of the junta to the people,
giving up their privileges, wealth and power, transferring the
political power to the people, the opposition, while being tried
for humanitarian crimes in a national or international court;
b. conditional reconciliation between the junta and the population,
represented by the opposition, gradually transferring power and
liberty to the opposition, while possibly agreeing not to be
prosecuted for past crimes and mistakes;
c. no change at all, continued rule by the junta in whatever clothing,
continued repression, political imprisonment, one-sided decisions,
unilateral laws, poverty, military abuse, economic exploit,
killing, raping, robbing and chasing, corruption, lying, cheating
and intimidation. This is what the junta calls 'Non-disintegration
of the Union', 'Non-disintegration of National Solidarity',
'Perpetuation of Sovereignty', 'Patriotism' and 'Union Spirit'.

Reconciliation
Scenario c. is what's actually happening now and it is very much
desired to change that; scenario a. is the ideal and is rightfully to
demand, but practically won't be allowed by the hostile, physically
strongest dominators. Scenario b. is in between and attempting to
realise this is compromising with the junta, making small steps at a
time. It may last for many years, many decades perhaps, until after
the current dictators have died, after the currently oldest
generations have died, maybe until after the current, lastly freely
elected and charismatic leader of the Burmese population, Aung San Suu
Kyi has died.

Yet, the second, reconciliation scenario makes a chance and should be
attempted. Aung San Suu Kyi already is on her way to do so, while
gradually being allowed more and more political engagement [41, 42].
Remember, it may still be possible for the junta to really reconcile
with the opposition and the population and escape prosecution if they
are prepared to, even while many voices call for an unconditional
trial [43]. If this scenario proves successful it may be longer
lasting because of a much better foundation (mutual agreements) than
any of the other alternatives.

Comfort
Do the revelations discussed comfort the Burmese people in their
misery? Does the slowly progressing way of Aung San Suu Kyi comfort
the people? Do the people still have hope or trust in the near future?
If these developments give the people hope for the future they still
have to have much patience as the democratisation process may go more
slowly than desired. But even gradual improvements should be viewed as
signs of progress finally leading to freedom and democracy. The people
are entitled to have some hope for the near future. The world needs to
closely watch the developments in Burma and judge and comment on it.

References

1. "EC Chief Says NLD Threatened Junta with 'Nuremburg-style' Trial",
Ba Kaung, Irrawaddy, July 29, 2011;
http://www.irrawaddy.org/article.php?art_id=21796

2. e.g. "8888 Uprising", Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia;
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/8888_Uprising

3. "EC Chief Says NLD Threatened Junta with 'Nuremburg-style' Trial",
Ba Kaung, BurmaNet News, July 29, 2011;
http://www.burmanet.org/news/2011/07/29/irrawaddy-ec-chief-says-
nld-threatened-junta-with-nuremburg-style-trial-ba-kaung/

4. "EC Chief Says NLD Threatened Junta with 'Nuremburg-style' Trial",
Ba Kaung, Voice of Chindwinn, July 29, 2011;
http://chindwinn.blogspot.com/2011/07/news-articles-on-
burma_29.html

5. (reference to Irrawaddy only); http://euro-
burma.eu/doc/2011_News_-_07_-_July.pdf

6. "EC Chief Says NLD Threatened Junta with 'Nuremburg-style' Trial",
Ba Kaung, Shan Herald, July 29, 2011;
http://www.shanland.org/index.php?option=com_content&view=article
&id=3902:weekly-diary-no456-23-july-29-july-2011-&catid=
weekly-diary&Itemid=271

7. "EC Chief Says NLD Threatened Junta with 'Nuremburg-style' Trial",
Ba Kaung, Peaceful Burma, July 29, 2011;
http://peacefulburma.blogspot.com/2011/07/news-articles-on-burma-
friday-29-july.html

8. (no longer available); http://pholonekyaw.wordpress.com/page/3/

9. (reference to Irrawaddy only);
http://www.burmapartnership.org/2011/08/25-31-july-daw-aung-san-
suu-kyi-and-ethnic-nationalities-nationwide-ceasefire-and-genuine-
dialogue-necessary-for-national-reconciliation/

10. (copy of Irrawaddy only),
http://groups.google.com/group/soc.culture.burma/browse_thread/
thread/90b69a08a30f71c1/fe069e0d818bd82f?lnk=gst&q=nld+1990
#fe069e0d818bd82f
and (copy of Irrawaddy only),
http://groups.google.com/group/soc.culture.burma/browse_thread/
thread/12d7c318a21c2ff8/a8e46402c756be91?lnk=gst&q=nuremburg
#a8e46402c756be91

11. "Separate talks between Human Rights Special Rapporteur Mr Thomas
Ojea Quintana and [...] Union Election Commission Chairman U Tin
Aye, [...]", The New Light of Myanmar, Wednesday, 26 August, 2011;
http://www.myanmargeneva.org/11nlm/aug/n110826.htm

12. "Separate talks between Human Rights Special Rapporteur Mr Thomas
Ojea Quintana and [...] Union Election Commission Chairman U Tin
Aye, [...]", The New Light of Myanmar, Wednesday, 26 August, 2011;
http://myanmargeneva.org/NLM2011/eng/8Aug/n110826.pdf

13. "Union Election Commission Chairman receives Australian
Ambassador", The New Light of Myanmar, Wednesday, 16 November,
2011; http://www.burmalibrary.org/docs12/NLM2011-11-16.pdf

14. "Burmese general election, 1990", Wikipedia, the free
encyclopedia;
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Burmese_general_election,_1990

15. "Junta sabotages election results", James Russell Brownwood,
Alternative New Light of Myanmar #19, 29 June 2009;
http://jrburma.int.tf/@NLM/Alt%20NLM%2029jun2009.pdf

16. "The Path to Extreme Violence: Nazism and Serial Killers",
Philippe Cotter, Frontiers in Behavioral NeuroScience / Geneva
International Academic Network, Switzerland, May 25, 2009;
http://miraclevision.com/miracle.vision.press/the-path-to-extreme-
violence.pdf

17. "When Child Soldiers Become Filmmakers, A call to break from
normalized evil", Kurt Shaw, Harvard Divinity Bulletin,
Spring/Summer 2009 (Vol. 37, Nos. 2 & 3);
http://www.hds.harvard.edu/news-events/harvard-divinity-
bulletin/articles/when-child-soldiers-become-filmmakers

18. "In International Criminal Prosecutions, Justice Delayed Can Be
Justice Delivered", Alex Whiting. Harvard International Law
Journal / Vol. 50, nr. 2, 2009 [note 155];
www.harvardilj.org/attach.php?id=191

19. "Does AustraliaÆs æwar criminalÆ testify to the banality of
evil?", Francis Wade, Democratic Voice of Burma, Wed 20 Jul 2011;
http://www.burmanet.org/news/2011/07/20/democratic-voice-of-burma-
does-australia%E2%80%99s-%E2%80%98war-criminal%E2%80%99-testify-
to-the-banality-of-evil-%E2%80%93-francis-wade/

20. "The Policy Context of International Crimes", Herbert C. Kelman,
Harvard University. draft paper for the Conference on System
Criminality in International Law, Amsterdam Center for
International Law, 20-21 October, 2006;
http://dev.wcfia.harvard.edu/sites/default/files/
Kelman_PolicyContext.pdf

21. "Why do people break laws?", Best Answer by Taylor;
http://answers.yahoo.com/question/index?qid=20111016161115AAVAwAj

22. "In-depth: Child soldiers, AFRICA: Too small to be fighting in
anyone's war", IRIN Humanitarian News and Analysis, 1 December
2003;
http://www.irinnews.org/IndepthMain.aspx?IndepthId=24&ReportId=
66280

23. "The Cognitive and Social Psychology of Contagious Organizational
Corruption" {p. 1179}, John M. Darley, Professor of Psychology and
Public Affairs, Princeton University;
http://psych.princeton.edu/psychology/research/darley/pdfs/
blr70iv_darley%20%282%29.pdf

24. "Obedience of Orders and the Law of War: Judicial Application in
American Forums", Gary D. Solis; http://www.auilr.org/pdf/15/15-2-
4.pdf

25. "Holocaust and Genocide Review (HGR) Information Resources, New
Initiatives in Genocide Studies and Prevention", GPN Issue 6,
Spring 2011;
http://www.genocidepreventionnow.org/Portals/0/docs/
Bibliography_Issue_6.pdf

26. "The junta can lift the sanctions", James Russell Brownwood,
Alternative New Light of Myanmar #23, 15 December 2009;
http://jrburma.int.tf/@NLM/Alt%20NLM%2015dec2009.pdf

27. "The Impact of Economic Sanctions, Volume I: Report", HL Paper No.
96-I (Select Committee on Economic Affairs, 2nd Report of Session
2006û07), House of Lords, London, 9 May 2007;
http://www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/ld200607/ldselect/
ldeconaf/96/96i.pdf

28. "Above it all", Irrawaddy, Friday, January 28, 2011;
http://www.irrawaddy.org/print_article.php?art_id=20624;
http://www.irrawaddymedia.com/cartoon.php?art_id=20624

29. comments of 'Senesino' and 'Wh1952' after "Burma: We must show our
solidarity with the democracy movement", editorial, The
Guardian/The Observer;
http://www.guardian.co.uk/commentisfree/2010/oct/03/observer-
editorial-burma-elections%20%28cmt%29

30a. "Benchmarking Burma", Benedict Rogers, Wall Street Journal Asia,
August 15, 2008;
30b. "Congress Bows to Big Oil in Burma: Chevron Can Continue to Drill
Offshore", Mike Lillis, July 23, 2008;
30c. "Burma Gives 'Cronies' Slice of Storm Relief, On Magazine's List
of Junta's Chosen Tycoons Are Some Facing U.S. Sanctions", Glenn
Kessler, June 13, 2008, Washington Post; in:
http://www.badasf.org/2008/cyclone-news.htm

31. "Why sanctions arenÆt working in Myanmar", Pauline Chiou, July 5,
2009, CNN;
http://edition.cnn.com/2009/WORLD/asiapcf/07/02/myanmar.sanctions/
index.html

32a. "The lingering disaster in Burma / Reign of terror in Burma
requires genuine U.N. action - not just official visits",
Benedict Rogers, Cutting Edge News Asia Desk: Mon 25 Aug 2008;
32b. "20 Years since 1988 - Japanese Policy Betrays the Burmese
People", Benedict Rogers, Nikkan Berita (Japan), 12 Aug 2008;
in: http://burma-update.blogspot.com/2008_08_01_archive.html

33. "Singapore doctor -- and alleged banker -- to Myanmar's generals",
AFP, November 13, 2007;
http://afp.google.com/article/ALeqM5g1rge7ezOxDsUAFVRQBylSfKMBlA

34. "Htoo Group of Companies"Cyclone Nargis", Wikipedia, the free
encyclopedia; http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Htoo_Group_of_Companies

35. "Burmese outraged at lavish junta wedding", Jonathan Watts, east
Asia correspondent, Guardian Unlimited, Thursday 2 November 2006;
http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2006/nov/02/burma.jonathanwatts

36. "SPDC who's who > Than Shwe", ALTSEAN-BURMA, Alternative Asean
Network on Burma;
http://www.altsean.org/Research/SPDC%20Whos%20Who/SPDC/ThanShwe.htm

37. "Burma leader considered Manchester United takeover, WikiLeaks
claims", Tom McTague, The Mirror, 7 December 2010;
http://www.thefreelibrary.com/BURMA+TYRANT+%26+MAN+UTD+BID.-
a0243675881; http://www.mirror.co.uk/news/top-
stories/2010/12/07/burma-leader-considered-manchester-united-
takeover-wikileaks-claims-115875-22767422/;
http://akastg.mirror.co.uk/news/top-stories/2010/12/07/burma-
leader-considered-manchester-united-takeover-wikileaks-claims-
115875-22767422/

38. "Did Cyclone Nargis Kill 300,000 People?", Marwaan Macan-Markar,
IPS News, 24 May 2008; http://ipsnews.net/news.asp?idnews=42499

39. "Former No. 2 Burmese leader said nearly 300,000 killed in Cyclone
Nargis", Ko Wild, Mizzima, 9 September 2011;
http://www.mizzima.com/news/inside-burma/5909-former-no-2-burmese-
leader-said-nearly-300000-killed-in-cyclone-nargis.html

40. "Cyclone Nargis", Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia;
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Cyclone_Nargis

41. "Suu Kyi urges world to keep eye on Myanmar", Sebastian Smith,
AFP, Sep 21, 2011;
http://www.google.com/hostednews/afp/article/
ALeqM5ig2kJhpmpljGPpj9GnGyy9-gkhqw?docId=
CNG.590c87bf3232828fdaaa5df9c4da5141.301

42. "Suu Kyi's NLD democracy party to rejoin Burma politics", BBC News
Asia, 18 November 2011; http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-asia-
15787605

43. e.g. "ABSU", Maung Kyaw Nu, A Political Prisoner of Conconscience
74,75,76 Student Generations, July 31, 2011;
http://www.irrawaddy.org/bur/index.php/news/6956--nld-, English
language comment by Maung Kyaw Nu

Regards,
JRB

James Russell Brownwood
James.Russell.Brownwood@Gmail.com
Justice Reforms Burma
http://jrburma.int.tf (@NLM archives, PGP public key)

Disclaimer: these views are entirely my own and unrelated to my
nationality, my home country and its political stances and they are
independent of and not contrary to my views on other similar events
and human rights violations elsewhere in the world.

The junta in 1990 appeared to fear prosecution and conviction for
humanitarian crimes. The junta obviously has been lying about the 1990
elections purpose. To avoid prosecution for crimes the junta increased
and intensified its humanitarian crimes. The junta implicitly has
admitted the NLD's victory in the 1990 elections. The NLD was right in
claiming its victory in 1990. The junta unjustly and treacherously
kept the NLD from taking over in 1990. What good can be expected from
the junta? By revealing the real truth Tin Aye stopped all
misunderstanding about the junta's real, bad intentions.

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